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THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE
MARSHALL B. KAPP, J.D., M.P.H.*
Among contemporary American academic health policy commentators,1
foundation researchers, 2 and liberal think tank analysts,3 the concept of consumer-
driven (also known as consumer-directed) health care is a subject of great
trepidation and loathing, akin to the ever-unpopular managed care scapegoat of
around a decade ago.4 In the case of consumer-driven health care (CDHC), these
emotions of dread emanate from several sources. Some critics have a rather
transparent political agenda,5 fearing that any success of the CDHC approach
would weaken the political support for a universal single-payer (i.e., federal
Copyright © 2009 by Marshall B. Kapp.
* Garwin Distinguished Professor of Law and Medicine, Southern Illinois School of Law, Carbondale,
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1. See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE
CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT (2007) (discussing the benefits and problems existing in consumer-
driven health care programs).
2. See, e.g., Sara R. Collins, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Why It Won't Solve What Ails the
United States Health System, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 53, 54 (2007) (reflecting an Assistant Vice President of
the Commonwealth Fund's skepticism about health savings accounts and high-deductible health plans).
3. E.g., Health Savings Accounts and High Deductible Health Insurance Plans: Implications for
Those With High Medical Costs, the Low-Income, and the Uninsured: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 7 (2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/ploadedPDF/901168-Blumberg-healthinsurance.pdf (statement of Linda J.
Blumberg, Ph.D., Principal Research Associate, The Urban Institute).
4. See Arnold J. Rosoff, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Questions, Cautions, and an
Inconvenient Truth, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 11, 18 (2007). See generally JAN GREGOIRE COOMBS, THE RISE
AND FALL OF HMOs: AN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION 290 (2005) (discussing how concerns
about rationing override the "desirable attributes that would make [HMOs] an appropriate vehicle for
delivering health care").
5. Although these critics rarely explicitly acknowledge their political agenda, usually it is quite
easy to identify.
[Certain] proposals . . . in the House Ways and Means Committee to require government
bureaucratic review and approval of each individual expense funded by a Health Savings
Account are a transparent attempt to destroy such accounts. Perhaps what is really intolerable
to these congressmen is the idea of Americans depending on their own choices and resources,
rather than being forced to depend on politicians as their only source of medical care. That
requires them to relentlessly oppose anything that makes health care affordable for most
Americans as an obstacle to implementing politically-controlled medicine.
Richard E. Ralston, Letter to the Editor, Don 't Kill Health Savings Accounts With Regulation, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 25, 2008, at A14.
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government) health care system;6 others accept the theoretical plausibility of CDHC
but lament that it just will not-indeed, cannot-work as theorized in actual
practice,7 and several base their objections on philosophical or religious concerns.8
I accept as my task in this article the mounting of an attempt to respond to the
value-based apprehensions of my colleagues, whose own views are set out
elsewhere in this symposium issue, 9 and specifically to outline the main ethical
framework undergirding and supporting the arguments of CDHC proponents in the
United States today.' 0
I. DEFINING THE CDHC MODEL
To pursue its tripartite objectives of making high-quality health care more
accessible to, and affordable by, more individuals, the CDHC model may take
many different structural forms."1 As I have explained elsewhere,
6. See generally David U. Himmelstein et al., Our Health Care System at the Crossroads: Single
Payer or Market Reform?, 84 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 1435, 1438-39 (2007) (arguing that the U.S.
should adopt a National Health Insurance program rather than a Consumer Directed Health Care
system). One devotee of federal government hegemony over the health care system, Professor Peter D.
Jacobson, smugly (but, to his credit, candidly) suggests a perverse reason to (almost) support CDHC:
A serious backlash to CDHC may be the best way to achieve some form of universal health
care, which I favor. As a result, part of me wants to adopt CDHC because doing so will
simply hasten the enactment of some form of universal health care or single-payer system.
After the experiment with CDHC fails, as it inevitably will, the only reasonable alternative
will lie with greater governmental involvement. Once the market solution is exposed, there
will be no more excuses and no justifications for further delaying universal health care. To
that extent, CDHC may be the necessary precursor to a more equitable health care delivery
system.
Kristin Madison & Peter D. Jacobson, Debate, Consumer-Directed Health Care, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 107, 113, 116 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/CDHC.pdf. Professor
Jacobson's notion might well be turned on its head. One might convincingly surmise that a short-term
experiment with a single-payer system would inevitably, disastrously fail, driving the public to embrace
more fully a CDHC approach, and to drag along recalcitrant academic antagonists of the competitive
marketplace with them.
7. See, e.g., Rosoff, supra note 4, at 31-33.
8. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Access to Health Care: Is Self-Help the Answer?, 29 J. LEGAL
MED. 23, 40 (2008) ("If you believe, as I do both on the basis of my faith and my experience, that many
hard-working poor people have not gotten everything in life that they deserve and that blessings are
meant to be shared, then, at least as to health care, solidarity-based sharing makes more sense [than
CDHC].").
9. See Rebecca Elon, The Ethics of Health Care Reform: Unintended Consequences of Payment
Schemes and Regulatory Mandates, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 63 (2009); Namrata Kotwani &
Marion Danis, Expanding the Current Health Care Reform Debate: Making the Case for Socio-
Economic Interventions for Low Income Young Adults, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 17 (2009).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See Marshall B. Kapp, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Implications for the Physician/Patient
Relationship, PHAROS, Spring 2007, at 12, 12-13. See generally CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004)
(explaining the theory and mechanics of the CDHC model and rebutting common criticisms).
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[t]he most usual version of the consumer-driven model contains three
separate but related parts.
1. A high-deductible health insurance product [HDHP] purchased for
the individual or dependents by either a person's employer or union, the
government, or the individual. It protects the insured person against the
risk of incurring catastrophic health care costs. These insurance policies
may vary regarding provider networks, particular services included,
benefit packages, and co-payment requirements.
2. An individually-managed, tax-exempt, interest-bearing HSA [Health
Savings Account], usually used to pay for routine and preventive
medical, dental, and vision services that cumulatively cost less than the
deductible amount specified in the insurance contract. Unused finds may
be rolled over into, and accumulated in, various kinds of investment
vehicles.
3. The so-called gap or doughnut hole. This component becomes
pertinent if an individual uses up all the funds in his or her HSA to pay
for medical care and then has to use personal, after-tax income until
expenses reach the deductible threshold and the insurance policy begins
to pay out.
12
II. ETHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Despite the many efforts exerted thus far to demonize "the logic and behavior
of HSA free-market economics," 13 the CDHC approach to health care reform 14 is
predicated on a legitimate set of ethical underpinnings.' 5 This moral foundation
contains both deontological and consequentialist (or teleological) components.'
6
12. Kapp, supra note 1l, at 13.
13. Halsted R. Holman, Health Savings Accounts-The Avoidance of Solution, PHAROS, Spring
2007, at 16, 16.
14. Across the political and ideological spectrum, there is broad consensus that the American health
care system is in serious need of some kind(s) of change. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Physicians, Achieving a
High-Performance Health Care System with Universal Access: What the United States Can Learn from
Other Countries, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 55, 72 (2008).
[T]he U.S. health care system is inefficient and inconsistent: Health care quality and access
vary widely both [sic] geographically among populations, some services are overutilized, and
costs are far in excess of those in other countries. Moreover, the United States ranks lower
than other industrialized countries on many of the most important measures of health.
Id. The unanswered question is what direction change should take. See Laura Meckler, Parties' Split
Most Apparent on Health Care-Democrats, Republicans Differ Over Roles of Government and Market
to Revamp System, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, at A4; Geoff Colvin, Making Health-Care History,
FORTUNE, June 9, 2008, at 20.
15. See infra Part II.
16. Id.
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a. Deontological Considerations
Deontological arguments are those that are based on ethical principles or
norms. 7 In the United States, the primary ethical principle in the health policy
arena is individual autonomy.' 8 "The law and ethics of medicine are today
dominated by one paradigm-the autonomy of the patient."1 9 Although some
academic commentators have begun to take aim at the viability of the autonomy
concept,20 it remains a vital force in legal and public policy formulation. 2' The
attempt to provide consumers with a meaningful opportunity for self-determination
regarding the financial parameters of their own health care is at the heart of the
CDHC movement.22
CDHC begins with the unassailable premise that someone, at some point,
needs to make decisions regarding the health care financial resources to be
available to each person.23 First, the health care system is plagued by inefficiency,
ineffectiveness, and waste; unnecessary or otherwise inappropriate medical services
should be eliminated (as should payment for those services) in the interests of both
cost-containment (i.e., making health care more affordable) and improving
quality.24 However, even when our attention is restricted to only those health care
interventions that hold some promise of producing benefits for a particular patient,
difficult coverage choices (put most bluntly, rationing) sometimes must be made
17. See H. TRISTRAM ENGLEHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 57 (2d ed. 1996) ("The
deontologists will consider the right- and wrong-making characteristics of the actions involved in order
to endorse [a] decision.").
18. CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL
DECISIONS 3 (1998).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109,
112, 126-27 (2004) (discussing the difficulties facing many individuals when attempting to make
informed health care decisions because of poor decision-making skills, anxiety, lack of medical
knowledge, or mental or physical impairment).
21. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 18, at 6 (discussing state and federal legislative efforts to enhance
patient autonomy through advance directives).
22. See EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER, HERITAGE FOUND., HEALTH CARE REFORM: DESIGN PRINCIPLES
FOR A PATIENT-CENTERED, CONSUMER-BASED MARKET 1-2 (2008), available at
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/13490/bg_2128.pdf?. sequence= 1.
23. See Kapp, supra note 11, at 15.
24. See Gerard F. Anderson & Kalipso Chalkidou, Spending on Medical Care: More is Better?,
299 JAMA 2444, 2445 (2008).
Currently, the United States spends more than twice as much as most other industrialized
countries on health care services, some regions of the United States spend twice as much as
other regions of the country, and some institutions or clinicians are twice as expensive as
others. In terms of outcomes and satisfaction, the United States may have reached the
position of diminishing returns for spending on medical care.
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because financial, as well as human2 5 and material, 26 resources available for
devotion to health care services ultimately are finite.27 The limited economic
capacity of any modem society, including the United States, to satisfy all medically
valid demands has been recognized quietly for a considerable time,28 but the
acknowledgment of limited resources and the consequent need to make choices has
become much more widespread and open recently. 19
There are a number of potential candidates for the role of health care rationing
agent3° the government,3' insurers,32 the community,33 individual physicians at
25. See Am. Coll. of Physicians, supra note 14, at 59 ("The United States is in the midst of a
primary health care workforce crisis that is expected to worsen precipitously in the next decade.").
26. See Thomas H. Lee, Rationing Influenza Vaccine, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2365, 2366 (2004).
Thomas H. Lee writes regarding the shortages of material health care resources, noting that:
With the flu-shot crisis, everyone-including the patients-knows that the shortage is not
artificial. The problem is not some company's unwillingness to pay for care or society's
reluctance to suffer a tax increase. Patients are not questioning physicians' financial motives.
And most patients say they want their flu shots to be saved for patients who are sicker than
they are.
Id.
27. See Marshall B. Kapp, Health Care Rationing Affecting Older Persons: Rejected in Principle
But Implemented in Fact, 14 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y 27, 28 (2002). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI &
PHILIP BOBBIr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (warning of the hazards of public involvement in rationing
choices).
28. See CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 27, at 186 (1978) (discussing the allocation of limited
quantities of kidneys among transplant patients in the United States); DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND
OF LIFE? THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 32 (1990).
29. See Am. Coll. of Physicians, supra note 14, at 63, 72.
As a wealthy nation, the United States can devote a greater share of its national income on
health care than can other countries. As wealth increases, individuals and society as a whole
have greater means to purchase health care services, including services that in other countries
might be considered discretionary or luxuries .... Although the United States produces and
consumes more goods and services than any other country, resources still are limited and
greater spending on health care will mean that less is available for other high-priority items,
such as housing, education, and national defense, or will contribute to the escalation of the
public debt.
Id. at 63.
30. See Brendan Miniter, The Weekend Interview with Mark Sanford: South Carolina's Contender,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, at All ("[S]omeone is going to cap it [health care expenditures]. It's just a
question of who is it going to be? A government bureaucrat? An HMO bureaucrat? Or is it going to be
you? But it is going to be somebody, because we can't keep growing health care at double digits and
expect to be competitive." (quoting South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford)).
31. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 133-38
(1987) (advocating that the federal government ration health care for older adults by setting stricter
limits on Medicare coverage).
32. See James E. Sabin & David Cochran, Confronting Trade-Offs in Health Care: Harvard
Pilgrim Health Care's Organizational Ethics Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1129, 1129-30, 1133 (2007)
(discussing how a group of health insurers rationed the distribution of Viagra and how health insurers
often make tough allocation decisions).
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the patient's bedside3 4 -but each of these alternatives has been largely unappealing
to a broad spectrum of the public and career policymakers.35 Thus, if someone must
perform the task of deciding how finite health care resources ought to be spent but
the other alternatives are bad, proponents of CDHC contend the ethical principle of
autonomy dictates that it ought to be the individual health care consumer who is
afforded both the right and responsibility to make decisions about the allocation of
limited health care dollars for his or her own health care services (i.e., what will be
purchased and what will be foregone).36 This ethical position promotes respect for
individuals by economically empowering purchasers to be in control of their own
respective health care programs, to the extent individuals can be in control in a real
world of finite resources.
37
The ethically and legally valid exercise of autonomy requires that a
cognitively and emotionally capable decision-maker act voluntarily and on the
basis of adequate information. 38 Critics of CDHC seek to infantilize people39 by
suggesting that health care is somehow so different (i.e., so much more inherently
and irreducibly complex and confusing) than other sorts of consumer goods and
services that decisions about how to spend one's own health care dollars are too
inscrutable and emotionally charged for mere consumers themselves to possibly
figure out.40 In reality, though, it is highly debatable whether health care purchases
are that much more fundamentally incomprehensible than other important decisions
that consumers make every day about buying,41 for example, real property, life and
casualty insurance, financial investments, or automobiles. The fact that most
individuals admittedly begin with a relatively low level of health literacy 42 in no
33. See Lawrence Jacobs, The Oregon Health Care Plan and the Political Paradox of Rationing:
What Advocates and Critics Have Claimed and What Oregon Did, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 161,
161-62 (1999) (describing Oregon's efforts to control Medicaid costs through rationing of services).
34. See Kapp, supra note 27, at 32.
35. HENRY J. AARON ET AL., CAN WE SAY No? THE CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE
131, 147-48 (2005).
36. See Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 19 (2006).
37. See id.
38. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 1-3 (1982).
39. Cf Marshall B. Kapp, Ninny Clients of the Nanny State? Selective Paternalism in Public
Benefit Programs for Older Americans, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 191-92 (2008) (discussing how
Social Security retirement and traditional Medicare programs infantilize older persons by presuming
them incapable of exercising autonomy regarding their own income security or health care).
40. See id. at 208, 211; see also Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA's Impact on Health
Care For Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 53 (2000) (discussing the argument that health
care is a "special" good).
41. See Kapp, supra note 39, at 211-12.
42. See OFF. OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., QUICK GUIDE TO HEALTH LITERACY 2.3 (2007) available at http://www.health.gov/
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way negates their ability to become sufficiently educated to make ethically valid
choices.
43
A burgeoning array of information sources is constantly becoming publicly
available to assist consumers to exercise autonomy in the health care marketplace.
44
Accessible "report cards" grading competing health plans on a comparative basis,
for use by consumers, abound.45 Certainly, a belief in the potential educability of
consumers has taken hold in analogous areas.46 For instance, the ethical and legal
doctrine of informed consent applies with full force in the arena of clinical
decision-making,47 where there is a strong (albeit rebuttable) presumption that
every adult patient is capable enough of understanding and manipulating often very
complex medical information to make and express valid autonomous choices
conceming specific diagnostic, therapeutic, and research interventions. 48 Similarly,
it is widely contended in policy and practice circles that many older disabled
persons and younger chronically disabled individuals are capable (with sufficient
informational and administrative support) of personally deciding upon and
directing even the most complicated aspects of their own home- and community-
based long term care. 49 There is no meaningful distinction between medical
informed consent, home- and community-based long term care, and similar
situations in which consumer autonomy is honored and applauded, on the one hand,
and the area of CDHC, on the other.
50
The personal autonomy rationale for CDHC has been summed up best by
George McGovem, a past populist candidate for President of the United States:"
communication/literacy/quickguide/Quickguide.pdf (stating that only 12 percent of adults have
proficient health literacy).
43. See id. at 2.4, 4.1-5.4 (explaining the ways in which health professionals and adult educators
can more effectively convey health information to American adults).
44. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1756,
1756 (2006) (describing initiatives to provide clearer information about quality, price, and efficacy to
health care consumers); Carolyn Clancy, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Advice Columns,
Navigating the Health Care System, http://www.ahrq.gov/consumer/cc.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
45. See e.g., Nat'l Comm. for Quality Assurance, Report Cards, http://reportcard.ncqa.org/
plan/extemalIPlansearch.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
46. See Kapp, supra note 36, at 13.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2, 10-11, 14.
49. See Carol J. Whitlatch, Older Consumers and Decision Making: A Look at Family Caregivers
and Care Receivers, in CONSUMER VOICE AND CHOICES IN LONG-TERM CARE 3, 13-15 (Suzanne R.
Kunkel & Valerie Wellin eds., 2006).
50. See Kapp, supra note 36, at 25 (explaining that the challenges facing autonomy proponents in
the consumer-driven health care paradigm are not fundamentally distinguishable from the challenges
facing patients in the clinical arena).
51. Edwin Harper, The New Populism: Radicalizing the Middle, TIME, Apr. 17, 1972, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,944465,00.html.
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I've come to realize that protecting freedom of choice in our everyday
lives is essential to maintaining a healthy civil society. Why do we think
we are helping adult consumers by taking away their options? We don't
take away cars because we don't like some people speeding. We allow
state lotteries despite knowing some people are betting their grocery
money. Everyone is exposed to economic risks of some kind. But we
don't operate mindlessly in trying to smooth out every theoretical
wrinkle in life. The nature of freedom of choice is that some people will
misuse their responsibility and hurt themselves in the process. We
should do our best to educate them, but without diminishing choice for
everyone else. 2
b. Consequentialist (Teleological) Considerations
"The consequentialists will analyze a particular bioethical case by considering
the consequences that make it appropriate or inappropriate to embrace a particular
decision., 53 There are several ways in which promotion of the CDHC model will
contribute to ethically desirable outcomes or results.
First, making health care affordable for people is a laudable social or
distributive justice goal.54 None of the financing models with which we have
experimented previously have been successful in containing the inexorable increase
in health care costs. 55 CDHC, by contrast, has the potential to achieve a meaningful
measure of cost containment.5 6 An informed, economically empowered consumer
is a better purchasing agent for his or her own health care than would be the
government, a managed care organization, or health care providers, in at least two
respects. Under CDHC, individuals have a personal incentive to shop around for
the best value for their dollars, thus fostering price competition among providers
who would need to vie for informed, cost-conscious customers to purchase their
52. George McGovern, Freedom Means Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at Al 5.
53. ENGLEHARDT, supra note 17, at 56-57.
54. See Wendy K. Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law: The Need for
a New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 346-47, 372 (1986) (explaining the importance of
access to health care in ensuring equality of opportunity).
55. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., National
Health Expenditures Aggregate, Per Capita Amounts, Percent Distribution, and Average Annual Percent
Growth, at tbl. 1 (2006), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf (indicating that national
health expenditures have continued to increase every decade from 1960 until 2006).
56. See PAUL FRONSTIN & SARA R. COLLINS, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FINDINGS
FROM THE 2007 EBR/COMMONWEALTH FUND CONSUMERISM IN HEALTH SURVEY (2008), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI-IB-03-2008.pdf (explaining that consumer-driven plans
encourage cost-conscious decision-making); Paul Fronstin & John MacDonald, Consumer-Driven
Health Plans: Are They Working?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2008, at A17.
[VOL. 12:1
2009] THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE 9
services in a vibrant free marketplace. 57 Competition would chisel away at current
price barriers.5 Moreover, because the individual consumer is economically
encouraged (because it is his or her own money at risk) to reduce the overuse of
health services whose necessity and value are questionable,59 there is a reasonable
chance to reduce much of the moral hazard, accounting for substantial waste and
inefficiency, that occurs when, as now, consumers have an incentive to overuse
60expensive services because a third party is paying for those services.
As expressed by one analyst:
For all its [CDHC's] problems, at least it puts the consumer in charge.
Would that create a world where we're forced to dicker with heart
surgeons? No. It will create a world where health care is treated as the
precious resource that it is, rather than a costless entitlement; where
nationwide competition pushes down the price of catastrophic care and
consumers focus their attention and budgets on what's really crucial to
their health. That's an important first step. The price of health care is
never going to get under control until patients get what they deserve: the
right to be consumers too.
61
Second, infusing the health care financing arena with economically
empowered and motivated consumers as purchasers creates an incentive for health
care providers to compete for patients on the basis of quality (as measured by
patient outcomes that can be compared easily by informed consumers) and
customer service.62 Improving health care delivery, both in terms of clinical
outcomes and customer satisfaction, serves the ethical goal of beneficence, or doing
good for the patient.63 Third, wider dissemination of the CDHC model holds the
potential for promoting social or distributive justice by improving access to good
57. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION, chap. 5, at 28-30 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/health care/204694.pdf (explaining that a well-functioning market will maximize consumer
welfare when consumers are able to make their own well-informed health care decisions and that price
competition will usually lead to lower prices); Madison & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 108-10 (explaining
that CDHC increases health care consumers' sensitivity to costs, which may create greater levels of
competition and reduce health care expenditures overall).
58. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 57, at chap. 1, at 41-43.
59. See Madison & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 108-09.
60. Id. at 109 ("CDHC's first potential long-run effect is to change the way that people think about
health care and health care coverage."). But see John A. Nyman, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Moral
Hazard, the Efficiency of Income Transfers, and Market Power, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2006)
(arguing against the view that CDHC will reduce prices by reducing moral hazard).
61. Shawn Tully, Why McCain Has the Best Health-Care Plan, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2008, at 143,
146.
62. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 57, at chap. 1, at 41-43; Madison &
Jacobson, supra note 6, at 109-10.
63. See William G. Kelly, Comment, Ericka and Myron: Canaries in the Mines, 13 ALB. L.J. SC.
& TECH. 173, 189-90 (2002) (explaining that the principle of beneficence requires physicians "to help
or at least to do no harm").
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quality health care provided in a decent customer service environment for many
people who lack such access today just because they are not economically
empowered. 64 Individuals who are uninsured or underinsured often have little
choice regarding where, when, and from whom they can receive their medical care,
because providers are not competing for their business;65 indeed, providers often do
whatever they can to discourage access to their (unreimbursed or insufficiently
reimbursed) services by the economically disadvantaged segment of the
population.66 A paradigm in which public support allows the presently uninsured
and underinsured population to participate as economically empowered, "skin in
the game" consumers in the health care marketplace makes members of that group
desirable customers for profit-seeking health care providers.67 Providers would
have a financial incentive to make their services accessible to this previously
shunned set of consumers. 68 Current inequities in health care access created by the
existence of significant pockets of people lacking the economic power to demand
easily available, high-quality, affordable health services could be reduced.
Another consequentialist underpinning of the CDHC paradigm is the Rule of
Second Best. This Rule basically means that, although everyone has a different
favorite solution, they almost all can agree on the second best alternative.
69
Historically, the United States has experimented in some depth with various public
and private command-and-control mechanisms of health care financing in which
the major decisions about health care coverage have been made by parties other
than the consumer: unmanaged fee-for-service,7 0 central health planning, 71 and
64. See Madison & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 116 ("To be sure, market competition is generally
good at reducing costs and improving quality.... For those who believe that excessive costs and poor
quality are the most glaring health care failures, CDHC could be a viable option."). Professor Jacobson
goes on, however, to express skepticism about the plausibility that reducing costs will lead to enhanced
access without governmental intervention. Id.
65. See Barry R. Furrow, Access to Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn't You Really
Rather Have a Pony?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405, 406 (2007) (noting that the poor and uninsured
must rely on the charity of providers as "health care beggars").
66. See Hoangmai H. Pham et al., Financial Pressures Spur Physician Entrepreneurialism,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 70, 76 (describing physicians' efforts to avoid low-income patients by
refusing to take new patients admitted through the emergency room).
67. See HAISLMAIER, supra note 22, at 1-2. Even in the absence of new government support for the
uninsured and underinsured, those groups will likely still benefit indirectly under a predominantly
CDHC regime. "Building a framework for disseminating information about health care prices could help
not only HDHP/HAS participants, but also the uninsured and anyone else financing their own care,
particularly if CDHC promotes price competition." Madison & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 112; see also
CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 11, at 200 ("Consumers who allocate funds they view as
theirs now have 'skin in the game."').
68. See HAISLMAIER, supra note 22, at 3, 7-8.
69. EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, HEALTHCARE, GUARANTEED: A SIMPLE, SECURE SOLUTION FOR
AMERICA 174-75 (2008).
70. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUR
GUIDE TO MEDICARE PRIVATE FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS 1, 7 (2007), available at
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managed care.72 None of these systems have come remotely close to producing
widespread, ongoing public or academic satisfaction with the value tradeoffs made
by the parties who controlled spending choices.73 The unmet challenge is illustrated
by the following two quotations. "The fundamental problem arises because of a
cost-coverage trade-off. Without controlling health care costs, any attempt at
universal coverage will be transient., 74 "The current rate of increase in societal
resources devoted to health care is widely thought to be unsustainable. . . .But
setting limits on expenditures of shared societal resources is ethically required for
sustainability [of the health care system]., 75 There is an urgent need for further
experimentation in the quest for improved quality, affordability, and access,7 6 and
the burden of proof at this point ought to rest on the proponents of paternalistic
approaches rather than the advocates of strategies that maximize consumer
autonomy. The individual consumer may not be the perfect ethical risk manager-
some may make bad decisions-but may well be the best alternative for the job.
III. KNOCKING DOWN THE STRAWPEOPLE
Even the staunchest opponents of CDHC (which is to say, the staunchest
proponents of a federal government-qua-single payer health care financing regime)
reluctantly admit, "Whether CDHC will benefit or harm individual enrollees is an
empirical question that has not yet been answered. 77 This lack of evidence,
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10144.pdf (explaining that Medicare Private Fee-for-
Service Plans must only cover what Medicare deems to be "medically necessary services" and that not
all providers accept the plan's payment terms); see also David M. Eddy, Balancing Cost and Quality In
Fee-For Service Versus Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 162, 163-64 (explaining
differences between fee-for-service and managed care); Pamela Signorello, The Failure of the ADA-
Achieving Parity With Respect to Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage in the Private
Employment Realm, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 376-77 (2001) (citing the fall of "unmanaged
fee-for-service").
71. Darwin Palmiere, Types of Planning in the Health Care System, 62 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1112,
1114 (1972).
72. Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REv.
73, 121 (2005).
73. See Kapp, supra note 11, at 12; see also Mark A. Levine et al., Improving Access to Health
Care: A Consensus Ethical Framework to Guide Proposalsfor Reform, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-
Oct. 2007, at 14, 17-18 (describing the problems and shortfalls of various ethical and financial tradeoffs
in the American system of health care delivery).
74. Ezekiel 1. Emanuel, The Cost-Coverage Trade-off: "It's Health Care Costs, Stupid", 299
JAMA 947, 947 (2008); see also Mark Schlesinger & Jacob S. Hacker, Secret Weapon: The "New"
Medicare as a Route to Health Care Security, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 247, 248 (2007)
(discussing how the evolving Medicare program, a private/public hybrid, may serve as a bridge to
universal health insurance coverage in the United States).
75. Levine et al., supra note 73, at 17.
76. See, e.g., Charles Kenney, Op-Ed., Finally, A Little Optimism In Healthcare, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jul. 30, 2008, at A13 (discussing the decline in health care quality in the United States and the current
need for easier access to medical care).
77. Madison & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 113-14, 120.
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however, has in no way inhibited critics of consumer control from suggesting a
parade of horrible results that would be visited upon the United States if CDHC
took hold more strongly.78 To the extent that critics can get away with portraying
an extreme libertarian version of CDHC,79 it certainly is possible that some of the
critics' fears might be realized. But, a less extreme and more compassionate version
of CDHC is considerably more likely,80 and under such a moderated approach the
worst horribles paraded by CDHC critics become more like strawpeople to be
knocked down.
a. CDHC Ignores the Poor
Social Darwinists81 would leave people to sink or swim with the vagaries of
life's health lottery and not be concerned about the inability of the poor to
participate in and reap benefit from society's health care delivery opportunities.
8 2
However, the overwhelming majority of CDHC advocates do not fall into that
philosophical category.83 There is nothing at all inconsistent between CDHC and a
strong sense of social responsibility and equity (not to be confused with equality in
the sense of mandated uniformity).84 The absence of monolithic control by a
government bureaucracy does not have to equal an absence of public subsidization
of participation by the poor in the private system. On the contrary, unlike current
and proposed health care financing systems that patronize poor people by using the
blunt force of law to deprive them of any meaningful control over the details of
their own health care, 5 CDHC is fully compatible with an agenda of leveraging
private interests with public dollars by empowering the poor to direct their own
78. See Amy Feldman & Peter Carbonara, Are You Ready to Own Your Health Care?, MONEY,
Nov. 2004, at 135, 136 (noting that critics of CDHC contend that CDHC would leave the poor with little
or no significant health care and would leave employees with a greater share of health care costs).
79. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?
18-23 (1997).
80. See Meredith Rosenthal & Arnold Milstein, Consumer-Driven Plans: What's Offered? Who
Chooses?, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1055, 1068-69 (2004) (explaining the market approval of
moderate forms of CDHCs that "emphasize consumerism").
81. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1969)
(discussing the lack of concern for the poor under Social Darwinism).
82. See William R. Patterson, The Greatest Good for the Most Fit? John Stuart Mill, Thomas Henry
Huxley, and Social Darwinism, 36 J. SOC. PHIL. 72, 72-73 (2005).
83. See Katherine Baicker et al., Lowering the Barriers to Consumer-Directed Health Care:
Responding to Concerns, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1328, 1330 (2007) (explaining that due to tax advantages, a
CDHC plan attracts and is available to both low- and high-income individuals).
84. See Madison & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 121 (arguing that, though CDHC has the potential to
decrease public support for equity programs such as universal health care, this will likely never happen).
85. See David R. Riemer, Follow the Money: The Impact of Consumer Choice and Economic
Incentives on Conflict Resolution in Health Care, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 423, 429-32 (2008).
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health care delivery with the benign help of progressive tax credits 86 and taxpayer-
supported vouchers or cash, in the same way that we use the governmental Food
Stamp program to entitle needy people to privately control their own nutrition
agendas.87 In both CDHC and the Food Stamp program, compassionate but
intelligent policymaking would utilize public dollars to purchase private control-
hence, a sense of dignity and respect-for those who would otherwise be
financially excluded from the benefits of consumer direction because lack of
finances made them supplicants of the mandatory government bureaucracy.
88
b. CDHC Means No Consumer Protection
Similarly, the claims of CDHC critics that this approach to health care
financing leaves vulnerable consumers unprotected against the perceived evils of
deregulation of the health care financing system 89 are ill-founded. On the contrary,
responsible proponents of CDHC would agree with Mark Hall and Carl Schneider
that "regulating markets and protecting consumers is a standard part of law's
agenda. Law specifically ameliorates the harshness of applying commercial law to
medical contracts in multiple ways" 90 and that "[g]ood private law is crucial to
good markets, to ensuring that fair contracts are fairly enforced."9 '
First, a consumer empowerment regime, properly implemented so that the
marketplace works as expected, will require more, not less, consumer protection
regulation regarding such matters as guaranteed information availability,
92
prohibitions on fraudulent business practices, 93 and restraints on competitive
conduct that restrains competition.9 4 Thus, CDHC would not entail deregulation at
86. See M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Disadvantaged, 26 HEALTH
AFF. 1315, 1323 (2007) (suggesting progressive tax subsidies as a method to increase CDHC's impact
on the economically disadvantaged); see also Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State
Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 396, 406 (2005) (noting the
existence of state tax subsidies for Health Savings Accounts).
87. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006); see also David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the
Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1056-58 (2005) ("[B]oth critics and
defenders of individual rights have seriously underestimated the contributions a[n individual] rights-
based system can make to the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental activities.").
88. See Rosoff, supra note 4, at 13, 21.
89. See Madison & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 109.
90. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New
Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 670 (2008).
91. Id. at 671; see also Riemer, supra note 85, at 442-43 (arguing that, in a consumer-driven
regime, disputes between patients and providers are less likely to arise in the first place).
92. See Rosoff, supra note 4, at 23, 30 (discussing the need for "information-forcing strategies" to
ensure that consumers have sufficient information to make health care decisions in a CDHC system).
93. See Jost & Hall, supra note 86, at 402, 407, 410, 416 (explaining possible fraudulent practices
in CDHC).
94. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 57, chap. 2, at 3, 15-17 (explaining
that many health care regulations limit physician competition); id. at chap. 8, at 3-4, 6-9 (describing the
anti-competitive tendencies of the health insurance market).
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all, but rather the pursuit of different, smarter forms of regulation than the blunt
objects that the current regulatory regime employs to bludgeon participants into
rough compliance.
95
Second, as Hall and Schneider have noted, the legal system has powers to
protect patients when providers abuse their contractual power. Happily,
courts command several doctrines for supervising contracts. Courts can
(1) fill in missing contract terms or declare contracts void for vagueness,
(2) amend or refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts, and (3)
evaluate the fairness of fiduciaries' behavior.
96
Furthermore, as a matter of consumer protection, under CDHC the states or federal
government would closely prescribe and oversee the practices of the health
insurance industry regarding the marketing, sale, and implementation of CDHC-
related insurance products.97 This regulatory opportunity would basically be lost
under the single payer (i.e., federal government) models advocated by most of the
critics of CDHC.95
c. CDHC Lets Employers "Off the Hook"
A third strawperson interjected by CDHC opponents is the erroneous claim
that the CDHC paradigm is somehow incompatible with the involvement of
employers as financial subsidizers of health insurance for their present and former
workers and those workers' dependents. 99 Contrary to that claim, this paradigm
presents no impediment to employers paying in whole or part for the HDHP
premiums covering present and former workers and those workers' dependents or
95. See Timothy Stolzfus Jost & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Legal Reforms Necessary to Promote
Delivery System Innovation, 299 JAMA 2561, 2561 (2008) (discussing the unintended but deleterious
impact on delivery system innovation exerted by the current regulatory system).
96. Hall & Schneider, supra note 90, at 671.
97. See generally Jost & Hall, supra note 86, at 407-17 (discussing the need for health insurance
regulation in a CDHC system).
98. See KAO-PtNG CHUA & FLAVIO CASOY, AM. MED. STUDENT Ass'N, SINGLE PAYER 101, at 9
(2008), available at http://www.amsa.org/uhc/SinglePayerl01.pdf (explaining how a single payer
system requires less regulation of physicians).
99. Jon R. Gabel et al., Employers' Contradictory Views About Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Results From A National Survey, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 21, 2004, http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.210vl/DCI. The proposition that employers still ought to be involved as
subsidizers of health care for their employees and dependents is itself a controversial one. See NAT'L
BUSINESS GROUP ON HEALTH, OPPOSING AN EMPLOYER MANDATE,
http://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pdfs/Opposing%20an%20Employer/20Mandate.pdf (last visited
Apr. 13, 2009). Cf Jane Zhang, Lawsuits Test Disabilities Act-Two Cases Cite Little-Known
Protections for People Who Aren't Disabled but Care for Those Who Are, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2008, at
DI (discussing several pending lawsuits filed under the "association discrimination" provision of the
Americans With Disabilities Act against employers who allegedly fired workers because of the medical
costs generated by family members). Ms. Zhang's article illustrates a problem that would cease to exist
if health care coverage were a matter of individual consumer choice instead of being yoked to a specific
job or employer.
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funding present employees' Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRAs).'00 In
fact, the prospect of achieving substantial systemic cost savings as an outcome of
moving the workforce and dependents more to CDHC may actually make
employers more amenable to contributing to health insurance coverage than they
are today,101 given that presently uncontrollable health care inflation discourages
increasing numbers of employers from subsidizing workers' health care more
generously.
0 2
CONCLUSION
Despite numerous boasts to the contrary,'0 3 no individual or group-either
internationally or within the United States-has yet produced the definitive,
comprehensive "answer" to the challenge of achieving the ideal combination of
health care quality, affordability, and accessibility. °4 Thus, sincere seekers of the
most reasonable trade-offs among these three components must be open to all
ideas, avoiding ideological closed-mindedness that would preclude the
consideration of potentially useful approaches to the conundrum. Reflexively
drawing false and inflexible adversarial dichotomies between "privatization" and
"commodification" of health care, on one side, and an abstract deification of "social
solidarity," on the other, 0 5 are foolish when virtually all reasonable observers of
100. NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, CONSUMER DRIVEN HEALTH CARE,
http://cdhc.ncpa.org/learn/hra (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
An HRA can be offered in conjunction with a high-deductible health plan, and is funded by
the employer for each participating employee. It pays for eligible health care expenses
typically covered under the medical plan. Unused funds can be carried over to the next year
to cover future health care expenses, an incentive to employees to use their personal HRA
wisely. If funds are exhausted, the employee is responsible for satisfying the remaining
deductible before the plan begins to pay. If the employee changes jobs, the money stays with
the employer.
Id.
101. See Rosoff, supra note 4, at 14-15 ("[A]s much or more than anything else, what is driving the
[CDHC] movement is employers' desire to limit their exposure to and responsibility for health care
costs increases.").
102. See, e.g., Paul Fronstin & Stephen Blakely, Is the Tipping Point in Health Benefits Near?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2008, at A 16 ("[L]arge employers all think that small employers might be on the
verge of taking such action (as dropping health benefits]."); Steve Jacob, Health Benefits Making
Employers Sick, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.), May 10, 2008, at A7 (addressing the cost-inspired trend of
businesses substantially reducing health insurance benefits).
103. See, e.g., EMANUEL, supra note 69, at 81-82; LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, THE HEALTHCARE FIX:
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE FOR ALL AMERICANS 92 (2007).
104. See Kapp, supra note 11, at 12.
105. See CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
108TH CONGRESS 283-94 (2003) available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb1O8-27.pdf
(discussing the "privatization" of health care); George France, The Form and Context of Federalism:
Meanings for Health Care Financing, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 649, 665 (2008) (defining "social
solidarity" in the health care setting); see generally CONSUMING HEALTH: THE COMMODIFICATION OF
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and participants in the health care financing and delivery enterprise acknowledge
that some combination of public and private responsibility is both unavoidable and
desirable. 
106
The CDHC model is properly "on the table" as one alternative in
contemporary American health policy formulation. In the absence of dazzling
success being radiated by other attempts to improve the health care financing anddelivery situation,107 CDHC deserves a fair trial and evaluation. The ethical
foundation undergirding this approach is sound. °8 It may be great intellectual sport
for critics to caricature market-based endeavors in the health care sphere, but
demonization exercises that summarily reject policy proposals simply because they
fail critics' liberal litmus tests'0 9 are likely to serve payers, providers, and actual or
potential consumers of health services quite poorly.
HEALTH CARE (Saras Henderson & Alan Peterson eds., 2002) (discussing the theoretical underpinnings
of consumerism in health care and manifestations of consumerism in the health care marketplace).
106. See generally ROSEMARY STEVENS, THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE HEALTH CARE STATE: ESSAYS ON
THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE POLICY (2007) (outlining the history of public/private
partnerships in American health care).
107. See Rosoff, supra note 4, at 19 ("[B]ecause nothing else has worked to control escalating health
care costs, we might as well give CDHC a shot-a 'last ditch' effort, if you will.").
108. See supra Part II.
109. E.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Voodoo Health Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,2008, at A23.
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